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A considerable number of empirical studies have 
investigated whether public, private for-profit, and 
private non-profit hospitals differ in terms of effi-
ciency. However, most of these studies have data 
and methodological problems limiting the gener-
alizability of the findings. Furthermore, none of the 
studies has considered parameters for the quality of 
care together with the number of cases as traditional 
output parameter. The German hospital sector is 
large, and several different ownership types have co-
existed for decades, making this a fruitful field for 
studying the effects of ownership on efficiency. Be-
cause of increasing cost pressure, the hospital sector 
in Germany has been subject over the past two dec-
ades to a variety of healthcare reforms aiming to 
stabilize expenditures at sustainable levels. The 
most significant reform in recent years was the in-
troduction of a new system of reimbursement based 
on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). The chief mo-
tivation behind this fundamental overhaul of the old 
reimbursement system, which was based on per-
diem charges, was to set financial incentives that 
would increase the efficiency of German hospitals 
(Schreyögg, Tiemann, and Busse 2006). 
Due to substantial overcapacities and the rapid 
changes currently taking place in the regulatory and 
competitive environment, the German hospital 
sector is now facing an extensive process of consoli-
dation and reorganization. In this context, hospitals 
are considering mergers, acquisitions, and coopera-
tive agreements as ways to improve competitive-
ness. Over the past decade, the total number of hos-
pitals in Germany has decreased and a growing 
number of hospitals have been privatized. Although 
there are several possible reasons for this develop-
ment, the main driver has been the need to increase 
hospital efficiency (Megginson, Nash, and van Ran-
denborgh 1994). 
The objective of the present study was to evaluate 
the relative efficiency of public, private for-profit, 
and private non-profit hospitals in Germany. To do 
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so, we used a bootstrapped DEA approach followed 
by a second-step truncated linear regression model 
while controlling for patient heterogeneity and ex-
ploring the impact of hospital organizational and 
environmental characteristics. Failing to take prop-
er account of these characteristics can lead to seri-
ously flawed conclusions (Fried, Knox Lovell, 
Schmidt, and Yaisawarng 2002). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next (i.e. 
second) section reviews the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of ownership on 
efficiency and quality of care. The third section pre-
sents the setting, data, and methodology used in this 
paper to explore this relationship. The fourth sec-
tion describes and discusses the estimated results, 
and the final section draws conclusions and makes 
suggestions for future research. 
2 Theoretical and empirical 
background 
The hospital industry in Germany is a fruitful field 
for studying the effects of ownership on hospital 
performance. It is one of the few sectors where dif-
ferent types of ownership have co-existed for dec-
ades, and it is large, ensuring an appropriate sample 
size. When selecting a central performance criterion 
for our analysis, we followed the example of other 
theoretical and empirical studies that have dealt 
with the comparison of ownership types. Standard 
performance measures such as return on invest-
ment and profitability were found to be inappropri-
ate for public and private non-profit entities 
(Leibenstein 1966; Feldstein 1967; Rees 1988; Pes-
tieau and Tulkens 1990). Consequently, we focus 
our analysis on technical efficiency, which is a key 
concept in measuring performance as it refers to the 
optimal use of resources in the production process. 
In particular, technical efficiency (i.e. productive 
efficiency) is a measure of how well an organization 
produces output from a given amount of input, or 
alternatively produces a given amount of output 
with minimum quantities of inputs. In order to 
address a key limitation of existing studies, our 
study examines both the productive efficiency im-
plications and patient health outcomes (i.e. quality 
of care) of hospital ownership. There have been 
many theoretical contributions on the effects of 
hospital ownership on efficiency and quality of care. 
The following discussion highlights the main argu-
ments. 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives and 
Development of Hypotheses 
By ownership, hospitals can be generally divided 
into private hospitals (i.e. private for-profit and 
private non-profit), invested and owned by private 
entities (i.e. individual or several private owners) 
and public hospitals, invested and owned mainly by 
public entities such as governments. Agency theory 
and property-rights theory, as well as public choice 
theory provide different explanations for a common 
outcome. Private for-profit ownership, they hy-
pothesize, is superior to public and private non-
profit ownership because private for-profit owner-
ship is associated with a higher productive effi-
ciency. These theories emphasize that differences in 
efficiency are due to substantial dissimilarities in 
objectives, incentives, and control mechanisms 
between ownership types. The following discussion 
highlights the main arguments. 
The agency theory assumes that managers (or 
agents) seek to maximize their own utility rather 
than that of the organization or its owners (or prin-
cipals). As a result, in all three types of hospital 
ownership owners face a principal-agent problem 
with those whom they hire to do the managing. 
Although both public and private hospitals face this 
problem, it is assumed that private for-profit hospi-
tals have better means to solve the principal-agent 
dilemma and therefore their performance in terms 
of productive efficiency is expected to differ signifi-
cantly. The owners of a profit-seeking hospital have 
profits as their measure of the manager’s success. 
The owner can limit divergences from his interest, 
by making the manager's compensation a positive 
function of the profits (i.e. a correlation between 
profits and managerial salaries and promotions). In 
addition, the income of executive physicians in pri-
vate for-profit hospitals might also be tied to hospi-
tal's financial performance. Within the public and 
private non-profit hospitals, individual decision 
makers rarely have their income tied to the hospi-
tal's performance (e.g., pay scales designed for civil 
servants); therefore no individual has a strong in-
centive to enforce efficient behavior. Accordingly, it 
is expected that private for-profit hospitals realize a 
higher level of efficiency than their public and pri-
vate non-profit counterparts (Reder 1965; Rice 
1966; Newhouse 1970; Lee 1971; Pauly and Redisch 
1973; Foster 1974; Sloan 1976; Fama and Jensen 
1983; Jacobs and Rapoport 2003). 
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According to the property-rights theory, ownership 
of a firm involves two essential rights: (1) the right 
to control the firm and (2) the right to appropriate 
the firm's profits (i.e. financial surplus). Accord-
ingly, the defining difference is that public and non-
profit hospitals are precluded from distributing, in 
financial form, its surplus to those in control of the 
organization (i.e. non-distribution constraint). 
Within for-profit hospitals, assigning some of the 
financial surplus to the individual who manage the 
hospital thus provides a way to monitor his activi-
ties. In this case, it is expected that the monitoring is 
automatic and self-imposed by the manager and 
that managers will have strong incentives to behave 
in the interests of the owners (Jacobs 1974; Clark-
son 1972; Hansmann 1988). In addition, potential 
divergences of interests between owners and man-
agers in private for-profit organizations are further 
reduced by external mechanisms, including (a) a 
market for ownership rights that enables the owners 
to sell their shares if they are not satisfied with ma-
nagerial performance; (b) the threat of takeover; (c) 
the threat of bankruptcy; and (d) an extensive ma-
nagerial labor market (Villalonga 2000). Thus, 
property-rights theory assumes that private for-
profit ownership is associated with a higher effi-
ciency compared to the other types of ownership. 
As part of public choice theories Buchanan and 
Tollison (1972), Niskanen (1975), and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) argue that politicians impose their 
objectives on public organizations in order to gain 
votes, which may conflict with profit maximization 
and, therefore, with productive efficiency. In the 
case of private non-profit providers Newhouse 
(1970) and Weisbrod (1988) argue that, because 
they lack the incentive to maximize profit, they 
should be expected to diverge from strict cost- or 
inefficiency-minimizing behavior and instead max-
imize quality, quantity, and/or prestige. Sloan 
(2000) supports this view and adds that productive 
efficiency will decay if objectives are vague and con-
tradictory, which is typically the case in public and 
private non-profit hospitals. 
According to the theories mentioned above, private 
for-profit hospitals are expected to maximize profits 
on the basis of a high level of productive efficiency. 
It is emphasized that dissimilarities in efficiency and 
quality of care are due to substantial differences in 
objectives, incentives, and control mechanisms. 
Owners may differ as some are more willing to sup-
ply more than the profit-maximizing services than 
are others. Such hospitals produce services that are 
not likely to be produced by a for-profit institution, 
unless, of course, dedicated subsidies exist for these 
services (e.g., supplementary for highly specialized 
services or centers in Germany). A profit-
maximizing hospital will produce services to the 
point where the marginal costs equal the marginal 
revenue. Public and private non-profit hospitals will 
expand their output at least to the point where the 
hospital just breaks even – that is, where the total 
cost equals total revenue. Much of the rationale for 
public and private non-profit hospital ownership is 
based on the welfare implications of these owner-
ship types (Hall 1995; Steinberg 2006; Rathgeb 
Smith and Gronbjerg 2006). 
Hypothesis 1: Private for-profit hospitals are 
more efficient than private non-profit and public 
hospitals. 
The character of the services that are provided by 
hospitals implies that quality of care is one major 
objective for hospitals in addition to efficiency. For 
the hospital sector, a common theoretical assump-
tion is that better quality of care requires more re-
sources and therefore reduces efficiency. It is fur-
ther assumed that due to information asymmetries 
between hospitals and other actors (e.g., patients 
and purchasers) hospitals may be able to vary their 
quality of care (Newhouse 1970; Weisbrod 1988). 
However, differences in the trade-off between pro-
ductive efficiency and quality of care among public 
and private non-profit providers have attracted little 
attention from a theoretical point of view. Given the 
strong efficiency focus of private for-profit providers 
it is argued that due to the trade-off those hospitals 
offer a lower quality of care than hospitals of other 
ownership types. In contrast, private non-profit and 
public hospitals allow more room for objectives 
other than efficiency and are therefore able to pro-
vide a higher quality of care than private for-profit 
hospitals. 
Another group of theorists argues that particularly 
physicians represent a group that is typically acting 
driven by high intrinsic motivation (Arrow 1963; 
Zismer 1999; Feess and Ossig 2007). Thus, physi-
cians are intrinsically motivated to deliver high 
quality of care. The enhanced behavioral discretion 
conditioned by the non-distribution constraint of 
public and private non-profit hospitals might pro-
vide a fruitful field for intrinsic motivation of physi-
cians to act in the patient’s best interest. In contrast, 
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the extrinsic motivation conditioned by financial 
incentive schemes usually provided in private for-
profit hospitals can be expected to result in a crowd-
ing out of intrinsic motivation (Osterloh and Frey 
2000; Frey and Jegen 2001). This effect lends sup-
port to the notion that private for-profit hospitals 
provide a lower quality of care. However, as physi-
cians have to act in accordance with regulations and 
ethical rules (e.g., clinical guidelines, Hippocratic 
Oath) a certain minimum standard of quality of care 
will be ensured. 
Hypothesis 2: The efficiency differences between 
ownership types will decrease if quality of care is 
taken into account to determine efficiency (i.e. 
quality-adjusted efficiency) due to an inevitable 
trade-off between efficiency and quality of care. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
There is a rich body of literature on hospital per-
formance in the United States and Europe. Two 
major reviews have been published in recent years. 
Hollingsworth (2008) reviewed the literature on 
frontier efficiency measurement techniques in 
healthcare. From the early 1980s up to mid-2006 a 
total of 317 studies had been published, almost 80 % 
of which made use of non-parametric DEA while 
most of the other studies used parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). Reviewing the studies on 
efficiency differences of hospital ownership Hol-
lingsworth found 39 studies and concluded that 
public hospitals in Europe and the United States 
appear to be more efficient than their private for-
profit and non-profit counterparts. Shen, Eggleston, 
Lau, and Schmid (2007) applied meta-analytic me-
thods to conduct a quantitative review of the em-
pirical literature on hospital ownership published 
between January 1990 and July 2004 (i.e. 16 em-
pirical studies). The authors concluded that owner-
ship had an impact on efficiency, but the conven-
tional assumption that private for-profit hospitals 
operate more efficiently was not supported in the 
review by Shen, Eggleston, Lau, and Schmid (2007), 
who indeed rather observed the opposite. 
Taken together Hollingsworth (2008) and Shen, 
Eggleston, Lau, and Schmid (2007) reviewed eleven 
international studies that have compared all three 
different types of ownership in terms of efficiency. 
In four studies public hospitals were found to be less 
efficient than their counterparts (Zuckerman, Had-
ley, and Iezzoni 1994; Ferrier and Valdmanis 1996; 
Brown 2003; Chang, Chang, Das, and Li 2004), 
while six studies showed that publicly owned hospi-
tals are more efficient than private for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals (Ozcan, Luke, and Haksever 
1992; Burgess and Wilson 1996; Koop, Osiewalski, 
and Steel 1997; Chirikos and Sear 2000; McKay, 
Deily, and Dorner 2003; Sari 2003). Burgess and 
Wilson (1998) found no significant efficiency differ-
ences associated with ownership. Out of these ele-
ven studies, seven studies have a large nation-wide 
sample and are based on comparable large data 
samples (i.e. sample sizes between 382 and 4,075 
hospitals). Among all eleven studies, none of the 
studies have used patient-level information to con-
trol for patient heterogeneity and to ensure the 
comparability of the observed hospitals which may 
be due to the lack of availability of adequate meas-
ures for patient heterogeneity between ownership 
types. Only two studies have used a two-stage analy-
sis (i.e. DEA followed by some form of regression 
analysis), despite the fact that in recent years it has 
become the state-of-the-art approach (Burgess and 
Wilson 1998; Ferrier and Valdmanis 1996). In addi-
tion, the study periods of all eleven studies are dated 
back to the late 1980s or 1990s, thus limiting the 
generalizability of the results. 
Empirical data on the efficiency of the German hos-
pital sector, and especially on the effect of owner-
ship status on hospital efficiency, are scarce. The 
efficiency of German hospitals has been investigated 
primarily using DEA. Staat and Hammerschmidt 
(2000) were the first to employ DEA to German 
hospitals, based on data of 160 hospitals in 1994. 
The authors found that DEA efficiency scores dif-
fered significantly between ownership types and 
that private non-profit hospitals were, on the aver-
age, less efficient than their public and private for-
profit counterparts. Using aggregate state-level data 
from 1991 to 1996, Helmig and Lapsley (2001) 
showed that public and non-profit hospitals appear 
to use relatively fewer resources than private for-
profit hospitals (n= 288). Staat (2006) applied a 
refined DEA approach to the same sample of 160 
hospitals for the year 1994 and found no significant 
efficiency differences associated with ownership. 
Herr (2008) employed SFA to investigate the effi-
ciency of about 1,500 German hospitals between 
2001 and 2003. Herr’s empirical results for the 
years 2000 through 2003 indicate that private for-
profit and non-profit hospitals were less efficient 
than publicly owned hospitals. 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 




Of the few studies that have investigated the effi-
ciency of the German hospital sector to date, all 
have important drawbacks. One of these is the lack 
of detailed data, which means that the quality and 
the quantity of the information used to assess effi-
ciency is often limited (e.g., aggregate state-level 
data, small sample size), thus limiting the gener-
alizability of results. Another drawback of these 
studies is their use of DEA. From a methodological 
point of view, some authors argue that results of 
DEA analysis are much more robust when study 
samples are very large (Shen, Eggleston, Lau, and 
Schmid 2007; Jacobs, Smith, and Street 2006). All 
of the DEA studies that have investigated the effi-
ciency of the German hospital sector thus far have 
used DEA alone without using a two-stage ap-
proach. In addition, none of the German studies 
used patient-level information on diagnoses, proce-
dures, and age to control for patient heterogeneity 
and to ensure the comparability of the observed 
hospitals. 
Our review of empirical studies suggests that, in 
contrast to the assumed behavior outlined in theory, 
there is no evidence that private ownership is asso-
ciated with higher efficiency compared to other 
ownership types. In fact, our review indicates that 
public hospitals use relatively fewer resources than 
private for-profit and non-profit hospitals. In addi-
tion, none of the mentioned studies has considered 
parameters for the quality of care together with the 
number of cases as traditional output parameter. 
The output of the hospitals’ production process has 
been measured in terms of physical units (e.g., 
number of patients treated or patient days). Al-
though an increasing number of studies have made 
adjustments for case mix, the intermediate hospital 
outputs (i.e. number of cases) are not adjusted for 
final health outcomes/quality of care (e.g., mortality 
rates or readmission rates). One reason for this 
might be the paucity of validated measures of qual-
ity. The absence of quality measures requires the 
implicit assumption that there are no systematic 
variations in quality, or that variations in quality do 
not systematically affect efficiency. However, studies 
examining the trade-off between efficiency and 
quality of care have provided evidence of an inevita-
ble trade-off between these two measures. Morey, 
Fine, Loree, Retzlaff-Roberts, and Tsubakitani 
(1992), Picone, Chou, and Sloan (2002) and Deily 
and McKay (2006) found that hospital efficiency 
was positively associated with the observed in-
hospital mortality rate. 
While testing the above mentioned hypotheses we 
also aimed to address methodological limitations of 
previous studies. First, we used a two-step method-
ology integrating covariates representing organiza-
tional and environmental characteristics in the sec-
ond stage regression that may have impact on hos-
pital efficiency. Second, we controlled for patient 
heterogeneity among hospitals by including vari-
ables representing case-mix complexity. Third, we 
relied on a large data sample to generate robust 
results. Fourth, we performed a number of robust-
ness checks to investigate the validity of our results. 
3 Research design and methods 
3.1 Setting and Data 
In Germany, approximately 1,800 hospitals provide 
inpatient care and receive DRG payments from 
social health insurance funds and private health 
insurance companies. The data for our study were 
derived from the annual hospital reports collected 
and administered by the Research Data Centre of 
the Statistical Offices of the Länder (For-
schungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen Landesäm-
ter 2008). This rich dataset covers all public, private 
for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals in Ger-
many and contains hospital-level information on 
costs and hospital infrastructure, as well as patient-
level information on age, diagnoses, and certain 
procedures performed per case. Our study is based 
on data from the fiscal years 2002-2006, and the 
unit of analysis was the hospital. Because of data 
privacy issues, we were able to obtain randomly 
selected data from only two-thirds of German acute 
care hospitals (n = 1318). To ensure the comparabil-
ity of the hospitals in the sample, hospitals provid-
ing only psychiatric care, day clinics, and hospitals 
with fewer than 50 beds were excluded from further 
analysis. In addition, content-based plausibility 
checks were conducted to reveal measurement er-
rors. Finally, a total of 1,046 hospitals remained in 
the sample and due to missing values in some years 
our sample for the years 2002 through 2006 is 
based on 4,902 observations. 
German hospitals can have public (PUBLIC), pri-
vate for-profit (PRIVATE-FP), or private non-profit 
(PRIVATE-NP) ownership status. Between 1993 
and 2006, the share of private for-profit hospitals 
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rose from 16 % to 28 %, whereas the share of public 
hospitals decreased from 43 % to 34 %. During the 
same period, the share of private non-profit hospi-
tals remained relatively constant (Forschungsdaten-
zentrum der Statistischen Landesämter 2008). 
3.2 First stage: Data Envelopment Analysis 
In the hospital sector, data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) has been the most frequently used approach 
for measuring efficiency (Hollingsworth 2008). 
DEA is a linear programming technique for evaluat-
ing the relative efficiency of individual organizations 
based on observed data. The relative efficiency of an 
organization is defined as the ratio of the weighted 
sum of its outputs to the weighted sum of its inputs. 
The weights are not pre-assigned, but rather deter-
mined by the model, thus avoiding any bias result-
ing from subjectively assigned weights. DEA as-
sesses the efficiency of organizations in two stages. 
First, the location and the shape of the efficiency 
frontier are determined based either on organiza-
tions that use the lowest input mix to produce their 
outputs or on organizations that achieve the highest 
output mix given their inputs. The efficiency frontier 
is constructed by joining these observations and all 
linear observations in the input-output space. In our 
study, we used an input-oriented DEA approach to 
address the following question: "To what extent can 
the input factors, defined as supplies and labor, be 
reduced proportionally without changing the output 
quantities of German hospitals?" Second, DEA 
measures inefficiency as the radial distance from the 
inefficient unit to the frontier and produces an effi-
ciency score that reflects the relative efficiency of 
each unit (Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu 2004). 
DEA allows multiple inputs and outputs to be con-
sidered simultaneously, which seems particularly 
well-suited for measuring the efficiency of hospitals. 
In contrast to parametric methods, where a specific 
pre-defined functional form is assumed to apply to 
each observation, DEA has the advantage of requir-
ing no assumptions about the functional form of the 
production or cost frontier. Although this reduces 
the need for a theoretical exposition of the model 
specification, there are other important considera-
tions. The DEA results are sensitive to the number 
of variables included in the model. In general, the 
number of inputs and outputs is limited by the sam-
ple size, which should not exceed one-third of the 
number of observed units (Banker, Charnes, Coo-
per, Swarts, and Thomas 1989). It is important to 
recognize that the inputs and outputs are collected 
routinely by hospital accounting departments, mak-
ing measurement errors less relevant. Based on our 
understanding of the market constraints within the 
German hospital sector, we assumed variable re-
turns to scale, which may be appropriate when it is 
impossible to assume that all observed units are 
operating at an optimal scale (Banker, Charnes, and 
Cooper 1984). In the healthcare sector, imperfect 
competition and budgetary constraints, as well as 
regulatory constraints on entry, mergers, and exits, 
may often result in organizations operating at an 
inefficient scale size (Jacobs, Smith, and Street 
2006). 
When selecting inputs and outputs, we followed the 
example of other studies that developed DEA 
frameworks for measuring hospital efficiency (Pi-
lyavsky, Aaronson, Bernet, Rosko, Valdmanis, and 
Golubchikov 2006; Jacobs, Smith, and Street 2006; 
Burgess and Wilson 1998). For the purposes of our 
study, six inputs and two outputs were considered. 
The first input variable (SUPPLIES) is the amount 
spent on supplies per year, including operational 
expenses, but excluding payroll, capital, and depre-
ciation expenses. Taking into account the relative 
importance of resource use in terms of labor in the 
hospital production process, additional input vari-
ables were the number of full-time equivalents 
(FTE) for the following personnel categories: clinical 
staff (CLIN), nursing staff (NURS), medical-
technical staff (MEDTECH), administrative staff 
(ADMIN), and other staff members (OTHER). 
The first output variable (INPATIENT) reflects the 
number of treated inpatient cases per year in each 
hospital. To adjust for variations in the quality of 
care between hospitals, we used the average mortal-
ity rates per year in each hospital. Therefore, the 
second output represents 1 minus the average hos-
pital mortality rate per year (1 - MORTALITY). This 
could lead to the concern that case mix might vary 
systematically across the hospitals in our sample, 
which would be problematic because hospitals with 
a more complex case mix should receive lower effi-
ciency scores in the first stage of our analysis. To 
help address this potential issue, we included case-
mix measures in our regression analysis as control 
variables (see further details in section 3.2). A de-
scriptive overview of the inputs and outputs used for 
our DEA model is given in Table 1. 
A correlation analysis (Appendix 1) shows that our 
multiple inputs are positively correlated with our 
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output set. This is an important prerequisite for 
applying DEA. In addition, subsets of inputs and 
outputs are often correlated. In our study especially 
the input variables are highly correlated. This might 
suggest that a limited number of inputs might ade-
quately represent the selected input set in our effi-
ciency assessment. However, several authors (e.g., 
Dyson, Allen, Camanho, Podinovski, Sarrico, and 
Shale 2001; Jacobs, Smith, and Street 2006) argue 
that omission of a highly correlated variable can 
lead to significant changes in the efficiency esti-
mates. They emphasize that correlation is an aggre-
gate measure of the closeness of two sets of ob-
served data. Therefore, variations of the input levels 
of individual hospitals may have little effect on the 
correlation, but significant effect on the measured 
efficiency. It may also give evidence for a possible 
production technology that is common among all 
decision-making units. In addition Dyson, Allen, 
Camanho, Podinovski, Sarrico, and Shale (2001) 
argue that the omission of variables in order to in-
crease discrimination is less relevant for large data 
samples. Thus, we used all input variables for our 
DEA model. 
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive 
statistics for first-stage analysis* 
Variable name Definition Mean SD 
CLIN Number of clinical 
staff in FTE 
78.17 106.54 
PUBLIC  112.7 182.8 
PRIVATE-NP  52.4 42.1 
PRIVATE-FP  47.9 63.1 
NURS Number of nursing 
staff in FTE 
225.8 225.3 
PUBLIC  296.6 353.4 
PRIVATE-NP  181.3 123.6 
PRIVATE-FP  137.5 132.3 
MEDTECH Number of medical 
technicians in FTE 
163.3 231.3 
PUBLIC  240.9 415.9 
PRIVATE-NP  106.5 80.7 
PRIVATE-FP  92.0 110.0 
ADMIN Number of adminis-
trative staff in FTE 
43.1 56.0 
PUBLIC  60.0 100.8 
PRIVATE-NP  31.1 19.9 
PRIVATE-FP  26.4 24.8 
OTHER Number of other 
staff in FTE 
87.4 106.7 
PUBLIC  127.7 184.9 
PRIVATE-NP  60.0 45.9 
PRIVATE-FP  44.1 45.9 
SUPPLIES Amount of supplies 
in million euros 
16.1 23.0 
PUBLIC  22.8 38.8 
PRIVATE-NP  10.6 9.5 
PRIVATE-FP  11.5 14.5 
INPATIENT Number of treated 
cases 
10,852 9,912 
PUBLIC  13,941 14,731 
PRIVATE-NP  8,809 5,839 
PRIVATE-FP  7,340 7,180 
1-MORTALITY 1 minus the average 
mortality rates per 
year  
0.974 0.015 
PUBLIC  0.973 0.011 
PRIVATE-NP  0.974 0.018 
PRIVATE-FP  0.977 0.020 
DEA I** Average DEA effi-
ciency scores 
0.634 0.138 
PUBLIC  0.649 0.130 
PRIVATE-NP  0.623 0.136 
PRIVATE-FP  0.619 0.170 
DEA II** Average DEA effi-
ciency scores 0.636 0.137 
PUBLIC  0.654 0.128 
PRIVATE-NP  0.623 0.136 
PRIVATE-FP  0.619 0.17 
DEA III** Average DEA effi-
ciency scores 0.662 0.133 
PUBLIC  0.674 0.125 
PRIVATE-NP  0.652 0.132 
PRIVATE-FP  0.658 0.158 
*Pooled sample including university hospitals and hospitals with 
beds 50. 
**DEA models are specified in table 2. 
Three model specifications served as a sensitivity 
analysis to test whether the efficiency scores and 
ranks remained stable when a specific variable 
(quality of care as second output) or specific provid-
ers (university hospitals) were removed or added. 
Efficiency models I and II both used INPATIENT as 
the only output variable, whereas university hospi-
tals were removed in the second analysis. The third 
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DEA model reflects quality of care using 1-MOR-
TALITY as a second output; here, too, university 
hospitals were excluded. The specifications are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2: Specification of DEA models* 
Models Trimming Output 
DEA I With university hospi-
tals 
INPATIENT 
DEA II Without university 
hospitals 
INPATIENT 
DEA III Without university 
hospitals 
INPATIENT &         
1-MORTALITY 
*Models are estimated per year (2002-2006) 
3.3 Second Stage: Truncated Linear 
Regression Model 
An important assumption of our study was that 
environmental and organizational factors may in-
fluence the relative efficiency of hospitals in addi-
tion to ownership. By considering the impact of co-
variates reflecting environmental and organizational 
factors on hospital efficiency we believe to provide a 
better explanation of the variation of efficiency and 
more robust results about the effects of ownership 
than previous studies that did not control for these 
effects. We therefore used the DEA efficiency scores 
obtained in the first stage of our analysis as depend-
ent variable in a truncated linear regression model, 
which became the favored approach owing to the 
censored distribution of the DEA-based relative 
efficiency estimates (Simar and Wilson 2007). This 
model is appropriate for these data, as these are 
bounded at both ends of the 0-1 distribution (Ja-
cobs, Smith, and Street 2006). However, this ap-
proach has been found to result in inconsistent es-
timates unless the DEA efficiency scores are cor-
rected by a bootstrapping procedure. The procedure 
applied in the present study follows the bootstrap 
approach developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 
2000). For our study, the bias-corrected scores were 
derived from 250 bootstrap iterations, which al-
lowed us to estimate a robust regression model as 
the second-stage analysis (Simar and Wilson 2007). 
Based on our theoretical framework, the following 
empirical model was used in the analysis. In the 
input-oriented case, the variable returns to scale 
variant of the BCC (Banker, Charnes, and Cooper) 
model can be formulated as a linear programming 
problem as shown below (Banker, Charnes, and 
Cooper 1984). Let i , i = 1,…,n , be the hospital’s 
efficiency where n  represents the number of obser-
vations (i.e. the number of hospitals). Matrix 
k xnX   refers to k  observed inputs of n  com-
pared hospitals and matrix r x nY   refers to r  
observed outputs of the compared hospitals. Vectors 
k
i x   and ki y   present the inputs and 
outputs of unit i , i.e. the i th columns of matrix X  
and Y  respectively. Furthermore, 1  refers to a 
column vector of ones with a suitable dimension. 
The DEA efficiency score, which is the reciprocal of 
the inefficiency, i  can be obtained by solving the 
following BCC linear programming model: 
(1)  Maxi i ,   
(2)  0s.t.   0,  Y y  
(3)  0 0,i 	 xX  
(4)  0 0,i 	 xX  
(5) T 1, 0.1     
In the second step, we used the following model 
specifications for our regression analysis. Let iZ  be 
each corresponding vector of covariates (i.e. types of 
ownership, hospital characteristics, environmental 
characteristics, and patient heterogeneity). Accord-
ing to Simar and Wilson (2007), we applied a trun-
cated linear regression to model hospital’s efficien-
cy. Therefore, we assumed i  as being distributed 
based upon a set of m n normally distributed 
random variables, j , j 1 , , m   with 
(6) j j j , 
  	Z  
where jZ  refers to a vector of covariates,   repre-
sents a parameter vector, and j
  is a normally dis-
tributed error term (i.e.  2N 0j ,
 
 ). On this 
basis 1 n, ,   is defined as the truncated set of 
1 m, ,   with 1j  , and i jZ Z  for 
i j   . 
We applied linear regression analysis to assess 
whether different types of ownership (PUBLIC, 
PRIVATE-FP, and PRIVATE-NP) led to differences 
in efficiency; we also considered a number of control 
variables. The use of control variables is of particu-
lar importance in the healthcare context because 
there are usually certain structural or regulatory 
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determinants of hospital efficiency that a hospital 
cannot influence. 
Heterogeneity in hospital characteristics was cov-
ered by the following variables. The first of these 
was the number of licensed and staffed beds 
(BEDS), an approach taken in previous studies to 
control for hospital size (Carey and Burgess 1999; 
Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, and Milstein 
2000; Harrison, Coppola, and Wakefield 2004). In 
the context of strict hospital planning in Germany, 
the number of beds per hospital can be seen, at least 
in the medium term, as an exogenous factor outside 
of hospital management's control (Busse and Ries-
berg 2004). To account for higher resource con-
sumption due to differences in teaching activities, 
we included a variable (TEACH) for the training of 
non-medical staff. These activities are represented 
by the ratio of trainee positions to the sum of all 
non-medical personnel. Another important point is 
that hospitals may hire out beds to self-employed 
ambulatory physicians (e.g., for ambulatory sur-
gery). The estimated DEA efficiency scores in the 
first stage of our analysis were higher for these hos-
pitals because the referring cases were counted as 
hospital output, whereas the corresponding re-
source use in terms of physicians was not consid-
ered on the input side. To control for this fact, we 
considered the proportion of all hospital beds that 
had been hired (HIRED BEDS) as variable in the 
regression models. The dummy variable "ambula-
tory care" (AMBULATORY) is related to missing 
data from the first stage of our analysis, which only 
considers the inputs for the production of ambula-
tory care, whereas the outputs of the ambulatory 
activities (e.g., ambulatory visits) were not captured 
in our data set. Because of the ongoing trend to-
wards privatization in Germany, one could argue 
that a large number of the existing private for-profit 
hospitals were recently converted from public and 
non-profit ownership status and that most of these 
hospitals represent inefficient units. Therefore, we 
included a dummy variable (CONVERSION) to 
account for public and non-profit hospitals that 
were privatized during the study period (n = 68). 
The set of explanatory variables representing the 
different environmental characteristics were as 
follows. The most important regressor is the Hir-
schman-Herfindahl index (HHI), which measures 
competitive pressure in a hospital's market, a stan-
dard economic measure of industry concentration. 
The market area was defined as the county in which 
a hospital was located, which is a frequently used 
definition in hospital studies (Chang, Chang, Das, 
and Li 2004; Rosko 1999, 2001, 2004; Rosko and 
Chilingerian 1999; Chirikos and Sear 1994). Al-
though there has been some controversy about the 
appropriate definition of a hospital's market area, 
Garnick, Luft, Robinson, and Tetreault (1987) re-
ported that, for the purpose of measuring competi-
tive activity, it made little difference whether a hos-
pital's market was defined as a county or as a radius. 
The HHI is obtained by squaring the regional mar-
ket share of a hospital (reflected by the distribution 
of treated cases), and then summing the market 
shares of admissions for all of the hospitals in the 
county. The higher the HHI, the more concentrated 
the regional market. We used HHI to measure the 
effects through the changes over time in hospitals' 
competitive environment. This specification allowed 
us to differentiate between the effects of ownership 
and the effects of changes in market structure re-
sulting from recent healthcare reforms. Further-
more, variations may also result from the fact that 
hospitals located in eastern or western Germany are 
different in terms of their infrastructure. After Ger-
man reunification in 1990, hospitals in eastern 
Germany received comparably higher subsidies 
from the federal government to upgrade their infra-
structure (Busse and Riesberg 2004). Thus, we 
defined being located in eastern Germany (includ-
ing all of Berlin) as a dummy variable (EAST). 
Because resource consumption can vary substan-
tially between patients, we also included 26 vari-
ables to control for variations associated with case-
mix complexity. We used patient-level information 
on diagnoses, procedures, and age to control for 
patient heterogeneity. To control for case-mix com-
plexity, we compiled a comprehensive list of co-
morbidities that have been found in other studies to 
affect mortality and resource use. In doing so, we 
relied on the Charlson Comorbidity Index (Sunda-
rarajan, Henderson, Perry, Muggivan, Quan, and 
Ghali 2004). Thus, the full set of case-mix measures 
are included in all of the regression models de-
ployed in our second-stage analysis. Another com-
mon approach would be to use the case-mix index 
whose weight reflects the relative costliness of 
DRGs. Due to data privacy issues, we were not per-
mitted to match the referring data. However, Carey 
(2000, 2002) reported that individual-level meas-
ures represent a vast improvement over aggregate 
case-mix measures and that the DRG case-mix in-
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dex is therefore a relatively weak measure of sick-
ness to control for patient heterogeneity. 
To check the robustness of our estimates, we per-
formed three regression models using the DEA effi-
ciency scores from three different DEA specifica-
tions as dependent variables (see Table 1). Table 3 
provides the definitions of variables for our second-
stage analysis and the overall descriptive statistics of 
our sample with respect to the dependent and inde-
pendent measures. 
 
Table 3: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for second-stage analysis* 
Variable name Definition Mean SD 
HHI Index for concentration of hospital cases per county 0.345 0.219 
PUBLIC  0.402 0.247 
PRIVATE-NP  0.283 0.187 
PRIVATE-FP  0.355 0.229 
BEDS Number of beds per hospital 330.3 279.3 
PUBLIC  417.7 418.6 
PRIVATE-NP  272.4 161.7 
PRIVATE-FP  231.2 199.8 
EAST Dummy variable for hospitals located in the eastern part of Germany 0.183 0.379 
PUBLIC  0.178 0.382 
PRIVATE-NP  0.139 0.346 
PRIVATE-FP  0.332 0.471 
AMBULATORY Dummy variable for hospitals that provide ambulatory care 0.783 0.395 
PUBLIC  0.856 0.351 
PRIVATE-NP  0.791 0.406 
PRIVATE-FP  0.525 0.500 
HIRED BEDS Ratio of hired out beds to all beds 0.068 0.141 
PUBLIC  0.065 0.115 
PRIVATE-NP  0.063 0.134 
PRIVATE-FP  0.091 0.243 
TEACH Ratio of apprenticeship training positions 0.269 0.426 
PUBLIC  0.302 0.518 
PRIVATE-NP  0.274 0.355 
PRIVATE-FP  0.150 0.355 
CONVERSION 
Dummy variable for hospitals that were privatized during study 
period 
68  
PUBLIC  50  
PRIVATE-NP  18  
*Pooled sample including university hospitals and hospitals with beds 50. 
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4 Findings and discussion 
The regression results for the three regression mod-
els are summarized in Table 4. A correlation analy-
sis of our explanatory variables suggested that mul-
ti-collinearity was not an issue in our study (see 
variance inflation factors in Appendix 3). The coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as marginal effects, and 
private for-profit hospitals served as a reference 
category. Throughout the models, ownership was 
coded as a dummy variable. The regression results 
for all three models showed that public hospitals 
operate at a significantly higher level of efficiency 
than their counterparts. According to this result our 
first hypothesis has to be rejected. However, the 
impact of public ownership was lower for the first 
model, which included university hospitals (effect of 
1.9 %; P0.01), than it was for the second model 
(effect of 2.3 %; P0.001). University hospitals were 
clearly associated with lower efficiency in our first 
model. This can be explained by the fact that univer-
sity hospitals produce multiple outputs (i.e. a com-
bination of patient care, education, and research) 
(Schreyögg and Reitzenstein 2008); as a result, 
their production process is not adequately captured 
by our DEA models. 
In addition to the different model variations per-
formed for sensitivity purposes we checked the ro-
bustness of our findings in several ways. To begin 
with, we re-estimated our first- and second-stage 
models with different windows for hospital sizes at 
the lower end of the sample. We performed four 
different models including all hospitals above 30 
beds, above 50 beds, above 70 beds, and above 100 
beds. Efficiency differences between private hospi-
tals and the two other hospital types tended to be 
slightly larger when 30 beds were used as the lowest 
hospital size included in our study while the results 
hardly changed when sizes of 70 beds or 100 beds 
were used as the minimum number of beds per 
hospital instead of 50 beds. Second, we run the 
second-stage models modifying the number of peri-
ods used in our regression (2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 
and 5 years). The modifications had very little effect 
on the coefficients representing different ownership 
types (see Appendix 4 and 5 for regression results). 
Looking at the development of efficiency scores over 
time it turns out that efficiency of all ownership 
types slightly increases over the years to a similar 
extent. Finally, in our third DEA model we used 1 
minus the average hospital mortality rate per year, 
which represents an index variable. Syrjänen (2004) 
 
Table 4: Regression results for each model 
Independent 
variables 
DEA I DEA II DEA III 
 Coefficients 
PUBLIC 0.019** 0.023*** 0.018** 
PRIVATE-NP 0.009 0.010 0.006 
PRIVATE-FP Served as reference category 
HHI 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.069*** 
BEDS (in 1,000) 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.064*** 
EAST 0.012* 0.012* 0.024*** 
AMBULATORY -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.028*** 
HIRED BEDS 0.049* 0.054** 0.038* 
TEACH 0.004 0.003 0.001 
CONVERSION -0.002 0.002 0.009 
26 Case-mix va-
riables  
Included Included Included 
* P0.05; ** P0.01; *** P0.001 
found that mixing index and volume measures in 
DEA may lead to biased results for the most com-
monly used constant returns to scale variant of the 
BM model (Banker and Moorey model) and the 
CCR model (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes model). 
However, this problem does not apply in our con-
text as we used a variable returns to scale variant of 
the BCC model. Thus, in our case the use of an index 
variable leads to robust results (Hollingsworth and 
Smith 2003; Syrjänen 2004). 
According to our second hypothesis a trade-off be-
tween efficiency and quality of care would lead to 
smaller efficiency differences between ownership 
types. Compared to DEA models I and II the relative 
efficiency of PUBLIC hospitals decreased in the 
DEA III model when quality was considered as an 
additional output. Thus, we indeed observed a 
trade-off between efficiency and quality of care sup-
porting hypothesis 2. However, the regression anal-
ysis that used quality-adjusted DEA efficiency scores 
as the dependent variable (i.e. DEA III) revealed 
significantly higher efficiency for public ownership 
compared to other ownership types. 
Our general finding that public hospitals perform 
better than hospitals with other forms of ownership 
is consistent with the results of several earlier stu-
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dies which, however, as mentioned earlier, have 
certain methodological limitations. Among the con-
trol variables, market concentration (HHI) and 
hospital size (BEDS) were important exogenous 
market effects, and the regression results revealed a 
significant positive association with efficiency in all 
three models (P0.001). In empirical studies on 
hospital efficiency, the variable "beds per hospital" 
is often used as a proxy for hospital size. However, 
as Breyer (1987) indicated, the variable also con-
tains information on capital inputs. If beds are in-
terpreted as a measure of size, we can conclude that 
larger hospitals perform significantly better. How-
ever, studies on the relationship between hospital 
costs and hospital size measured in terms of beds 
have generally identified a U-curve, because mar-
ginal costs tend to decline with increased size and 
then rise again, as indicated by a negative sign for 
the variable "squared beds per hospital" in the re-
gression (Carr and Feldstein 1967). In our regres-
sion, the variable "squared beds per hospital" and 
also the variable "cubed beds", which would imply a 
cubic relation, were not significant. Thus, our study 
shows that, in contrast to the evident relationship 
between costs and hospital size, the relationship 
between efficiency and hospital size is linear. In this 
context, it is important to emphasize that this find-
ing is not biased by our scale assumptions. In our 
DEA model specification we used variable returns to 
scale because constant returns to scale are assumed 
to represent a hospital planning view or a govern-
mental view (Steinmann, Ditrich, Karmann, and 
Zweifel 2004). 
In their review of the literature, Scherer and Ross 
(1990) and Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) 
found that the degree of competitiveness in a firm's 
market was a potential source of lower efficiency. 
Classical economic theory predicts that organiza-
tions in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets re-
strict output and have higher average costs than 
competitive organizations. In our study, market 
competition was measured using the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index, which is defined over a range 
between zero and one such that increases in HHI 
correspond to decreases in hospital competition. 
Therefore, the positive coefficient lends support to 
the notion that a hospital’s behavior is highly af-
fected by competition in the hospital sector, though 
in a direction that is inverse to that seen in markets 
for most other goods and services. In the German 
context, this finding is also related to the strict regu-
lations in place regarding hospital planning. Com-
petition between hospitals in Germany does not 
occur primarily in terms of individual patients, but 
with regard to the optimal fit of demand and supply 
in terms of hospital infrastructure (e.g., specialties, 
departments, number of beds). Our findings indi-
cate that hospitals operating in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets are more likely to agree with 
the hospital planning authorities on a hospital infra-
structure that enables a convergence of demand and 
supply in the referring county. Overcapacities in 
urban areas result in greater competitive pressure 
(i.e. cutthroat competition), whereas counties with 
lower competitive pressure are likely to be more 
rural. As a regulatory instrument, hospital planning 
is supposed to lead to optimal hospital infrastruc-
ture and efficiency. Our results indicate, however, 
that this is a questionable assumption that needs to 
be addressed by further research. However, Rosko 
(1999, 2001, 2004) and Rosko and Chilingerian 
(1999) found efficiency in the US hospital sector to 
be negatively related to market competition, a find-
ing similar to that in our own study. 
Figure 1 shows the DEA efficiency scores and qual-
ity-adjusted DEA efficiency scores as predicted val-
ues (from the DEA II and DEA III models) versus 
hospital size and market concentration for the dif-
ferent types of ownership. Generally, there was a 
linear relationship between hospital size and DEA 
efficiency scores and quality-adjusted DEA effi-
ciency scores. 
Taking a closer look at the three different curves, it 
becomes clear that public hospitals outperformed 
their private for-profit and non-profit counterparts 
up to a size of approximately 1,000 beds. From 
1,000 beds onwards, the private for-profit hospitals 
operated with greater efficiency, which also holds 
after taking quality into account. However, most 
private for-profit providers in Germany operate 
within a size range of 50 to 800 beds. Indeed, of the 
hospitals in our sample that had more than 1,000 
beds, only 15 were private for-profit hospitals, whe-
reas 119 were public hospitals. 
Generally, the relationship between market concen-
tration and efficiency / quality-adjusted efficiency 
was also linear, although the public hospitals in our 
sample operated at a substantially higher level of 
efficiency in all of the various settings of competitive 
pressure (Figure 1). 
Private for-profit hospitals show a comparably low 
level of performance in very competitive markets. 
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Here, it is important to recognize that private for-
profit and non-profit hospitals operate primarily in 
urban and other more competitive areas, whereas 
public hospitals operate both in urban and non-
competitive regions (Figure 2). 
Furthermore, it is striking that in Figure 1, particu-
lar in relation to market concentration, the effi-
ciency curves and quality-adjusted efficiency curves 
of private for-profit hospitals are descending first 
and then raise linear. This descending curve can be 
explained by an interaction effect between private 
ownership, hospital size and market concentration. 
Those private for-profit hospitals operating in more 
competitive regions have comparably smaller enti-
ties in these regions than hospitals of other owner-
ship types. Therefore, the hospitals represented by 
the descending curve combine three characteristics 
that are associated with lower efficiency. If private 
for-profit hospitals operate in more concentrated 
regions the size of the entities approaches that of 
other ownership types and thus differences between 
efficiency scores of different ownership types be-
come smaller. 
As expected, other control variables also had a sig-
nificant impact on efficiency (Table 4); the case-mix 
variables, in particular, had a major impact in this 
regard (see Appendix 2 for the full model specifica-
tion). Our set of case-mix variables accounted for 
approximately two-thirds of the explained variance 
in the three full models (based on ordinary least 
square estimates), which indicates the importance 
of adjusting for patient heterogeneity. As expected, 
the operational efficiency of hospitals located in 
eastern Germany (EAST) was significantly greater 
than that of their western counterparts. This can be 
explained by the large investments made to mod-
ernize hospital infrastructure in eastern Germany 
after the German reunification in 1990. In addition, 
hiring out a larger share of beds to ambulatory phy-
sicians was associated with higher efficiency 
Figure 1: DEA efficiency scores and quality-adjusted DEA efficiency scores 
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(HIRED BEDS), and the existence of ambulatory 
care activities was associated with lower efficiency 
(AMBULATORY). 
Several of our findings are likely to be thought-
provoking, because they are counter-intuitive and 
are not in line with the arguments put forward by 
authors in the field of agency theory and property-
rights theory, as well as public choice theory. This 
may be explained by a number of specific character-
istics of the hospital market in Germany. Our results 
show that for-profit status was associated with lower 
efficiency. However, for-profit hospitals may have 
found a different way to maximize their profits (i.e. 
financial surplus) than hospitals with other forms of 
ownership. Indeed, they may seek to maximize their 
profits by maximizing revenues instead of minimiz-
ing inputs at a given output, which was defined as a 
measure of efficiency in our study. Wörz (2008) 
supports this view, having found that private for-
profit hospitals (and especially hospital chains) were 
able to generate significantly higher revenues per 
case on the average than hospitals with other forms 
of ownership. This study of a large German hospital 
sample (n = 1,614) with data from 2004 reflects the 
pre-DRG era in Germany, during which prices could 
be negotiated. However, even after the introduction 
of DRGs, today there are still a substantial number 
of additional reimbursement components being 
paid on the top of DRGs that can be negotiated at 
the hospital level (e.g., certain expensive drugs). 
Indeed, these additional components account for 
approximately 20 % of total reimbursements for 
non-psychiatric inpatient care (Schreyögg, Tie-
mann, and Busse 2006). Shen, Eggleston, Lau, and 
Schmid (2007) found comparable results for the US 
hospital sector, concluding that the mission of pri-
vate for-profit hospitals puts greater emphasis on 
earning profits (i.e. higher revenues per case due to 
higher prices) compared to public hospitals, which 
focus primarily on efficiency. 
Private for-profit providers are more efficient 
among the very large hospitals with more than 
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1,000 beds. This finding is in line with the theories 
mentioned above. Private for-profit providers have 
stronger incentive schemes and control mecha-
nisms, which are of crucial importance for the man-
agement of larger organizations (Bishop and 
Thompson 1992). 
Our results also indicate that private for-profit hos-
pitals provide a higher quality of care compared to 
other types of ownership. As mentioned above, 
theoretical approaches assume that information 
asymmetries exist in the hospital market and thus 
particularly for-profit hospitals have the incentive 
(i.e. profit-seeking) to increase productive efficiency 
at the expense of quality of care. However, in the 
German hospital sector information asymmetry has 
decreased over the last decade due to a variety of 
healthcare reforms aiming at quality assurance (e.g., 
mandatory publication of quality reports). Further-
more, the mentioned theoretical approaches do not 
account for the strategic importance of quality of 
care in markets with substantial overcapacities (i.e. 
cutthroat competition). There is evidence that pri-
vate for-profit hospitals (and especially private for-
profit hospital chains) operating in more competi-
tive regions have improved their quality manage-
ment and hospital outcomes in order to attract pa-
tients (Busse, Nimptsch, and Mansky 2009). 
Our study has a number of strengths plus adds value 
compared to previous approaches. First, it applies a 
more refined approach to investigate the effects of 
ownership on hospital efficiency in Germany. To our 
knowledge, it is the first study to examine the rela-
tionship between ownership status and efficiency 
using a panel data approach based on bootstrapped 
DEA efficiency scores. Second, our panel (n = 1,046) 
is large and covers the majority of all German acute-
care hospitals over five years, allowing us to control 
for serial correlation and providing greater statisti-
cal power than in previous studies leading to more 
robust estimates. Third, the sample is rich, contain-
ing information at the patient and hospital levels. 
Within our two step approach, this allowed us to 
control appropriately for case-mix and other envi-
ronmental and organizational characteristics, and is 
likely to have yielded more consistent results. 
Fourth, this is the first ownership study in the hos-
pital sector to incorporate quality measures as out-
puts in DEA models. 
Our study also has several important limitations. 
First, additional inputs and outputs (e.g., ambula-
tory cases as an additional output, or capital as an 
additional input) would have helped us capture 
more of the resources required in and all of the out-
put produced from the hospital production process. 
Considering the number of outpatient cases in addi-
tion to inpatient cases is generally recommended in 
order to measure patient care output (Jacobs, 
Smith, and Street 2006). We intended to include a 
proxy for hospital outpatient activities (e.g., outpa-
tient surgery). However, data inconsistencies and 
measurement errors did not allow us to use this 
information for further analysis. 
Including other explanatory factors in addition to 
environmental and organizational characteristics 
might have provided a better explanation of varia-
tion in our estimates, thus potentially affecting our 
interpretation of the relationship between owner-
ship and efficiency. Another limitation may be that 
this study uses mortality as the only indicator for 
quality of care. Moreover, we were not able to take 
account of hospitals that were privatized during the 
3 years prior to our study period. Nevertheless, our 
study results gave no indication that the hospitals 
privatized during our study period were primarily 
inefficient units. Finally, our study employed only 
DEA, although it would have been possible to use 
SFA in addition to DEA. SFA was not included in 
the analysis, however, because it relies on assump-
tions about the functional form of the production or 
cost frontier that we aimed to avoid. Further, Linna 
(1998) found that both methods yielded comparable 
results for individual efficiency. 
5 Summary and outlook 
In this paper, we investigated the effects of owner-
ship on hospital efficiency in Germany. Our findings 
show that public ownership was associated with 
significantly higher efficiency than other forms of 
ownership; private for-profit ownership, in particu-
lar, was associated with lower efficiency. These key 
findings remained unchanged after conducting a 
number of sensitivity checks. Our results suggest 
that private for-profit hospitals place greater em-
phasis on earning profits (i.e. higher revenues per 
case due to higher prices), whereas public hospitals, 
because of resource constraints, focus primarily on 
input efficiency. We also found a significant positive 
association between hospital size and efficiency, and 
that competitive pressure had a significant negative 
impact on hospital efficiency. From a strategic man-
agement point of view, private for-profit hospitals 
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may be well advised to change their acquisition 
strategy in terms of choice of hospital size and loca-
tion. In addition, the ongoing trend towards privati-
zation in Germany may not be an appropriate way 
to ensure the best use of the scarce resources in the 
hospital sector, because public hospitals use rela-
tively fewer resources than private for-profit hospi-
tals. Additional longitudinal studies are thus needed 
to measure and compare the efficiency of privatized 
hospitals. This could be a fruitful way to gain a bet-
ter understanding of the consequences of ongoing 
privatization in the hospital sector. 
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Appendix 1: Correlation matrix for the input and output variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 - CLIN 1        
2 - NURS 0.936 1       
3 - MEDTECH 0.971 0.915 1      
4 - ADMIN 0.950 0.893 0.940 1     
5 - OTHER 0.870 0.890 0.872 0.874 1    
6 - SUPPLIES 0.960 0.909 0.951 0.907 0.835 1   
7 - INPATIENT 0.911 0.948 0.856 0.841 0.821 0.862 1  
8 - 1-MORTALITY 0.084 0.067 0.088 0.073 0.074 0.093 0.075 1 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix for the organizational and environmental variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 - HHI 1       
2 - BEDS 0.106 1      
3 - EAST 0.359 0.101 1     
4 - AMBULATORY 0.041 0.162 -0.072 1    
5 - HIRED BEDS -0.041 -0.197 -0.168 -0.081 1   
6 - TEACH 0.001 0.134 -0.060 0.018 -0.077 1  
7 - CONVERSION 0.062 0.003 0.040 -0.035 -0.042 0.043 1 
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Appendix 3: Regression results for each model - full model specification 
Independent vari-
ables 




















Ownership              
PUBLIC 0.019 0.007 2.850 0.004 0.023 0.007 3.380 0.001  0.018 0.007 2.720 0.007 
PRIVATE-NP 0.009 0.007 1.340 0.180 0.010 0.007 1.450 0.147  0.006 0.006 0.890 0.376 
PRIVATE-FP served as reference category            




             
HHI 0.086 0.010 8.970 0.000 0.085 0.010 8.860 0.000 1.29 0.069 0.009 7.420 0.000 
BEDS (in thousands) 0.061 0.010 6.380 0.000 0.085 0.011 8.040 0.000 1.62 0.064 0.010 6.500 0.000 
EAST 0.012 0.006 2.020 0.043 0.012 0.006 2.060 0.040 1.34 0.024 0.006 4.220 0.000 
AMBULATORY -0.018 0.005 -3.480 0.001 -0.019 0.005 -3.750 0.000 1.15 -0.028 0.005 -5.690 0.000 
HIRED BEDS 0.049 0.017 2.950 0.003 0.054 0.016 3.250 0.001 1.12 0.038 0.016 2.380 0.017 
TEACH 0.004 0.005 0.940 0.347 0.003 0.005 0.750 0.454 1.15 0.001 0.005 0.190 0.853 
CONVERSION -0.002 0.009 -0.180 0.857 0.002 0.009 0.180 0.859 1.12 0.009 0.009 0.950 0.344 
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Appendix 3 continued: Regression results for each model - full model specification 
Independent vari-
ables 




















Case-mix variables              
AVAILAB. PET 
(yes/no) 




0.027 0.006 4.370 0.000 0.024 0.006 3.820 0.000 1.68 0.020 0.006 3.320 0.001 
AGE  65a -0.099 0.025 -3.890 0.000 -0.110 0.025 -4.370 0.000 2.04 -0.185 0.024 -7.610 0.000 
ARTIFICIAL RES-
PIRATIONa 
-0.345 0.048 -7.180 0.000 -0.355 0.048 -7.330 0.000 1.19 -0.377 0.046 -8.230 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
HIVa 
-12.52 2.386 -5.250 0.000 -22.39 4.256 -5.260 0.000 1.74 -22.74 4.067 -5.590 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
CYSTIC FYBROSISa 
-3.519 2.802 -1.260 0.209 -3.343 2.885 -1.160 0.247 1.04 -4.633 2.790 -1.660 0.097 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BURN INJURYa 
-10.15 2.287 -4.440 0.000 -11.15 2.280 -4.890 0.000 1.05 -12.11 2.195 -5.520 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BRAIN INJURYa 
-0.128 0.074 -1.730 0.084 -0.122 0.073 -1.660 0.098 1.11 -0.143 0.071 -2.020 0.043 
TRANSPLANTA-
TIONa 
-2.973 1.085 -2.740 0.006 -4.001 1.151 -3.480 0.001 1.06 -4.719 1.107 -4.260 0.000 
ACUTE MYOCAR-
DIAL INFARCTIONa 
-2.410 0.689 -3.500 0.000 -2.235 0.686 -3.260 0.001 1.48 -3.125 0.663 -4.710 0.000 
CONGESTIVE 
HEART FAILUREa 
0.393 0.212 1.860 0.064 0.463 0.210 2.200 0.028 1.50 0.368 0.202 1.820 0.068 
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Appendix 3 continued: Regression results for each model - full model specification 
Independent vari-
ables 




















Case-mix variables              
PERIPHERAL VAS-
CULAR DISEASEa 
-2.218 0.791 2.800 0.005 -1.766 0.790 -2.240 0.025 1.02 -1.996 0.765 -2.610 0.009 
CEREBRAL VAS-
CULAR ACCIDENTa 
0.407 0.212 1.920 0.055 0.398 0.210 1.900 0.058 1.40 0.078 0.203 -0.390 0.699 
DEMENTIAa -0.792 0.427 -1.860 0.063 -0.760 0.422 -1.800 0.072 1.20 0.556 0.417 1.330 0.183 
PULMONARY  
DISEASEa 
1.086 0.339 3.200 0.001 1.158 0.336 3.450 0.001 1.10 0.618 0.320 1.930 0.053 
CONNECTIVE TIS-
SUE DISORDERa 
-0.469 0.094 -5.010 0.000 -0.455 0.093 -4.910 0.000 1.05 0.026 0.092 0.280 0.779 
PEPTIC ULCERa 3.898 1.384 2.820 0.005 3.063 1.371 2.230 0.025 1.46 -1.795 1.323 -1.360 0.175 
LIVER DISEASE a 0.795 0.494 1.610 0.108 1.028 0.500 2.050 0.040 1.33 0.721 0.465 1.550 0.121 
DIABETESa 0.777 0.249 3.120 0.002 0.748 0.244 3.060 0.002 1.06 0.325 0.231 1.410 0.160 
DIABETES COM-
PLICATIONSa 
-0.920 0.946 -0.970 0.331 -0.391 0.944 -0.410 0.679 1.11 -0.014 0.922 -0.020 0.988 
PARAPLEGIAa -8.831 1.393 -6.340 0.000 -8.758 1.376 -6.360 0.000 1.08 -7.220 1.207 -5.980 0.000 
RENAL DISEASEa -0.172 0.199 -0.860 0.387 -0.153 0.197 -0.780 0.438 1.17 0.327 0.211 1.550 0.121 
CANCERa -0.715 0.419 -1.710 0.088 -0.299 0.427 -0.700 0.484 1.19 -1.032 0.413 -2.500 0.013 
METASTATIC CAN-
CERa 
-0.373 0.352 -1.060 0.290 -0.490 0.350 -1.400 0.161 1.18 -1.072 0.339 -3.160 0.002 
SEVERE LIVER 
DISEASEa 
6.619 5.888 1.120 0.261 7.752 5.923 1.310 0.191 1.40 -0.591 5.731 -0.100 0.918 
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Appendix 3 continued: Regression results for each model - full model specification 
Independent vari-
ables 




















Case-mix variables              
HIVa -166.8 128.2 -1.300 0.193 -138.6 130.5 -1.060 0.288 1.74 -144.0 126.4 -1.140 0.255 
              
Years              
YEAR 2003 0.017 0.006 2.720 0.006 0.017 0.006 2.750 0.006 1.61 0.014 0.006 2.300 0.021 
YEAR 2004 0.022 0.006 3.480 0.000 0.027 0.006 4.280 0.000 1.68 0.026 0.006 4.230 0.000 
YEAR 2005 0.024 0.006 3.750 0.000 0.030 0.006 4.710 0.000 1.83 0.036 0.006 5.710 0.000 
YEAR 2006 0.052 0.007 8.010 0.000 0.054 0.007 8.280 0.000 2.04 0.040 0.006 6.290 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.576 0.010 58.03 0.000 0.567 0.010 57.06 0.000   0.662 0.010 68.53 0.000 
PSEUDO-R² 0.146    0.161     0.157    
a Share of all cases per hospital 
* p0.05; ** p0.01; *** p0.001 
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Appendix 4: Regression results – modification of the number of periods useda 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Ownership                 
PUBLIC 0.023 0.007 3.380 0.001 0.021 0.007 2.880 0.004 0.019 0.009 2.150 0.031 0.020 0.011 1.870 0.062 
PRIVATE-NP 0.010 0.007 1.450 0.147 0.008 0.007 1.080 0.279 0.007 0.009 0.760 0.446 0.008 0.011 0.710 0.477 
PRIVATE-FP served as reference category               




                
HHI 0.085 0.010 8.860 0.000 0.084 0.011 7.910 0.000 0.085 0.012 6.990 0.000 0.091 0.015 6.130 0.000 
BEDS (in thousands) 0.085 0.011 8.040 0.000 0.076 0.012 6.530 0.000 0.087 0.013 6.510 0.000 0.088 0.016 5.340 0.000 
EAST 0.012 0.006 2.060 0.040 0.012 0.006 1.940 0.052 0.011 0.007 1.470 0.141 0.005 0.009 0.570 0.570 
AMBULATORY -0.019 0.005 -3.750 0.000 -0.020 0.006 -3.480 0.001 -0.018 0.007 -2.660 0.008 -0.016 0.008 -1.960 0.050 
HIRED BEDS 0.054 0.016 3.250 0.001 0.038 0.018 2.090 0.037 0.026 0.021 1.210 0.226 0.025 0.026 0.970 0.330 
TEACH 0.003 0.005 0.750 0.454 0.006 0.005 1.210 0.227 0.007 0.005 1.340 0.179 0.008 0.005 1.440 0.150 
CONVERSION 0.002 0.009 0.180 0.859 0.002 0.011 0.200 0.839 0.001 0.013 0.070 0.948 -0.003 0.016 -0.160 0.875 
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Appendix 4 continued: Regression results – modification of the number of periods useda 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables                 
AVAILAB. PET 
(yes/no) 




0.024 0.006 3.820 0.000 0.022 0.007 0.840 0.001 0.016 0.008 1.950 0.051 0.005 0.010 0.540 0.592 
AGE  65b -0.110 0.025 -4.370 0.000 -0.109 0.028 -3.880 0.000 -0.151 0.033 -4.580 0.000 -0.167 0.039 -4.230 0.000 
ARTIFICIAL RES-
PIRATIONb 
-0.355 0.048 -7.330 0.000 -0.331 0.049 -6.710 0.000 -0.338 0.059 -5.700 0.000 -0.365 0.087 -4.200 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
HIVb 
-22.39 4.256 -5.260 0.000 -9.821 2.965 -3.310 0.001 -28.92 6.291 -4.600 0.000 -33.98 8.217 -4.140 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
CYSTIC FYBROSISb 
-3.343 2.885 -1.160 0.247 -2.067 3.203 -0.650 0.519 -2.015 3.923 -0.510 0.608 0.062 5.208 0.010 0.990 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BURN INJURYb 
-11.15 2.280 -4.890 0.000 -13.02 2.624 -4.960 0.000 -13.49 3.104 -4.350 0.000 -10.84 4.183 -2.590 0.010 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BRAIN INJURYb 
-0.122 0.073 -1.660 0.098 -0.119 0.074 -1.600 0.109 -0.102 0.075 -1.360 0.173 -0.093 0.077 -1.210 0.228 
TRANSPLANTA-
TIONb 
-4.001 1.151 -3.480 0.001 -3.813 1.144 -3.330 0.001 -3.709 1.178 -3.150 0.002 -2.655 1.725 -1.540 0.124 
ACUTE MYOCAR-
DIAL INFARCTIONb 
-2.235 0.686 -3.260 0.001 -2.384 0.748 -3.190 0.001 -2.188 0.906 -2.410 0.016 -1.684 1.303 -1.290 0.196 
CONGESTIVE 
HEART FAILUREb 
0.463 0.210 2.200 0.028 0.568 0.283 2.010 0.045 1.622 0.458 3.540 0.000 2.112 0.599 3.530 0.000 
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Appendix 4 continued: Regression results – modification of the number of periods useda 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables                 
PERIPHERAL VAS-
CULAR DISEASEb 
-1.766 0.790 -2.240 0.025 -2.307 0.974 -2.370 0.018 -2.328 1.323 -1.760 0.079 -5.261 2.437 -2.160 0.031 
CEREBRAL VAS-
CULAR ACCIDENTb 
0.398 0.210 1.900 0.058 0.319 0.216 1.480 0.139 0.204 0.247 0.820 0.410 0.138 0.290 0.480 0.633 
DEMENTIAb -0.760 0.422 -1.800 0.072 -0.887 0.457 -1.940 0.052 -0.723 0.500 -1.450 0.148 -0.823 0.573 -1.440 0.151 
PULMONARY  
DISEASEb 
1.158 0.336 3.450 0.001 1.140 0.385 2.960 0.003 1.659 0.495 3.350 0.001 1.199 0.554 2.160 0.031 
CONNECTIVE TIS-
SUE DISORDERb 
-0.455 0.093 -4.910 0.000 -0.416 0.101 -4.110 0.000 -0.400 0.113 -3.520 0.000 -0.402 0.141 -2.860 0.004 
PEPTIC ULCERb 3.063 1.371 2.230 0.025 2.783 1.496 1.860 0.063 3.217 1.722 1.870 0.062 4.739 2.141 2.210 0.027 
LIVER DISEASEb 1.028 0.500 2.050 0.040 1.172 0.588 2.000 0.046 0.710 0.708 1.000 0.316 0.430 0.951 0.450 0.651 
DIABETESb 0.748 0.244 3.060 0.002 0.656 0.265 2.480 0.013 0.580 0.309 1.880 0.060 0.750 0.490 1.530 0.126 
DIABETES COM-
PLICATIONSb 
-0.391 0.944 -0.410 0.679 -0.131 1.286 -0.100 0.919 0.780 1.497 0.520 0.602 1.215 1.767 0.690 0.492 
PARAPLEGIAb -8.758 1.376 -6.360 0.000 -7.137 1.253 -5.700 0.000 -6.023 1.312 -4.590 0.000 -4.660 1.413 -3.300 0.001 
RENAL DISEASEb -0.153 0.197 -0.780 0.438 -0.171 0.284 -0.600 0.548 -1.305 1.445 -0.900 0.366 -4.263 2.582 -1.650 0.099 
CANCERb -0.299 0.427 -0.700 0.484 -0.738 0.387 -1.910 0.057 -0.492 0.464 -1.060 0.289 -0.528 0.652 -0.810 0.418 
METASTATIC CAN-
CERb 
-0.490 0.350 -1.400 0.161 -0.370 0.389 -0.950 0.342 -0.264 0.467 -0.570 0.571 -0.690 0.741 -0.930 0.352 
SEVERE LIVER 
DISEASEb 
7.752 5.923 1.310 0.191 7.262 6.534 1.110 0.266 5.102 7.798 0.650 0.513 6.268 12.99 0.480 0.629 
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Appendix 4 continued: Regression results – modification of the number of periods useda 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables                 
HIVb -138.6 130.5 -1.060 0.288 -15.76 71.84 -0.220 0.826 -65.83 79.80 -0.830 0.409 -19.65 108.9 -0.180 0.857 
                 
Years                 
YEAR 2003 0.017 0.006 2.750 0.006             
YEAR 2004 0.027 0.006 4.280 0.000 0.010 0.006 1.630 0.103         
YEAR 2005 0.030 0.006 4.710 0.000 0.012 0.006 1.960 0.050 0.003 0.006 0.430 0.666     
YEAR 2006 0.054 0.007 8.280 0.000 0.036 0.006 5.580 0.000 0.027 0.006 4.110 0.000 0.024 0.006 3.950 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.567 0.010 57.06 0.000 0.591 0.011 54.25 0.000 0.603 0.013 47.94 0.000 0.606 0.015 40.33 0.000 
PSEUDO-R² 0.161    0.136    0.142    0.142    
a DEA II - Efficiency model including hospitals with beds 50, without university hospitals. 
b Share of all cases per hospital. 
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Appendix 5: Regression results - modification in terms of hospital sizea 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Ownership                 
PUBLIC 0.028 0.006 4.340 0.000 0.023 0.007 3.380 0.001 0.022 0.006 3.510 0.000 0.027 0.007 3.780 0.000 
PRIVATE-NP 0.012 0.006 1.840 0.065 0.010 0.007 1.450 0.147 0.005 0.006 0.750 0.456 0.016 0.007 2.190 0.029 
PRIVATE-FP served as reference category               




                
HHI 0.076 0.009 8.180 0.000 0.085 0.010 8.860 0.000 0.070 0.009 7.490 0.000 0.046 0.010 4.790 0.000 
BEDS (in thousands) 0.109 0.011 10.16 0.000 0.085 0.011 8.040 0.000 0.024 0.021 1.160 0.247 0.058 0.021 2.700 0.007 
EAST 0.022 0.006 3.910 0.000 0.012 0.006 2.060 0.040 0.013 0.006 2.270 0.023 0.026 0.006 4.300 0.000 
AMBULATORY -0.010 0.005 -1.980 0.047 -0.019 0.005 -3.750 0.000 -0.019 0.005 -3.970 0.000 -0.016 0.005 -3.060 0.002 
HIRED BEDS 0.072 0.017 4.340 0.000 0.054 0.016 3.250 0.001 0.060 0.016 3.730 0.000 0.171 0.022 7.650 0.000 
TEACH 0.010 0.005 2.160 0.031 0.003 0.005 0.750 0.454 0.010 0.005 2.150 0.031 0.021 0.005 4.700 0.000 
CONVERSION 0.001 0.009 0.070 0.942 0.002 0.009 0.180 0.859 0.001 0.009 0.130 0.897 0.014 0.009 1.490 0.136 
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Appendix 5 continued: Regression results - modification in terms of hospital sizea 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables                 
AVAILAB. PET 
(yes/no) 




0.026 0.006 4.270 0.000 0.024 0.006 3.820 0.000 0.013 0.006 2.210 0.027 0.012 0.006 1.980 0.048 
AGE  65b -0.196 0.026 -7.640 0.000 -0.110 0.025 -4.370 0.000 -0.124 0.020 -6.040 0.000 -0.387 0.033 -11.70 0.000 
ARTIFICIAL RES-
PIRATIONb 
-0.264 0.043 -6.070 0.000 -0.355 0.048 -7.330 0.000 -0.463 0.049 -9.380 0.000 -0.201 0.082 -2.460 0.014 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
HIVb 
-4.945 1.890 -2.620 0.009 -22.39 4.256 -5.260 0.000 -23.91 4.180 -5.720 0.000 -26.11 3.942 -6.620 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
CYSTIC FYBROSISb 
-2.711 2.806 -0.970 0.334 -3.343 2.885 -1.160 0.247 -4.083 2.818 -1.450 0.147 -4.324 2.645 -1.630 0.102 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BURN INJURYb 
-11.05 2.274 -4.860 0.000 -11.15 2.280 -4.890 0.000 -8.842 2.246 -3.940 0.000 -10.76 2.129 -5.050 0.000 
SPECIAL FACILITY 
BRAIN INJURYb 
-0.191 0.073 -2.610 0.009 -0.122 0.073 -1.660 0.098 -0.104 0.068 -1.530 0.127 -0.869 0.286 -3.040 0.002 
TRANSPLANTA-
TIONb 
-4.183 1.144 -3.660 0.000 -4.001 1.151 -3.480 0.001 -4.297 1.081 -3.970 0.000 -4.570 1.013 -4.510 0.000 
ACUTE MYOCAR-
DIAL INFARCTIONb 
-2.091 0.660 -3.170 0.002 -2.235 0.686 -3.260 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.560 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.360 0.173 
CONGESTIVE 
HEART FAILUREb 
0.246 0.208 1.180 0.237 0.463 0.210 2.200 0.028 0.000 0.000 2.660 0.008 0.000 0.000 5.590 0.000 
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Appendix 5 continued: Regression results - modification in terms of hospital sizea 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables -1.791 0.782 -2.290 0.022 -1.766 0.790 -2.240 0.025 0.000 0.000 -0.460 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.906 
PERIPHERAL VAS-
CULAR DISEASEb 
0.236 0.202 1.170 0.243 0.398 0.210 1.900 0.058 0.000 0.000 1.380 0.168 0.000 0.000 2.570 0.010 
CEREBRAL VAS-
CULAR ACCIDENTb 
-1.509 0.420 -3.590 0.000 -0.760 0.422 -1.800 0.072 0.000 0.000 -3.870 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -6.210 0.000 
DEMENTIAb 0.457 0.326 1.400 0.161 1.158 0.336 3.450 0.001 0.000 0.000 4.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.940 0.000 
PULMONARY  
DISEASEb 
-0.695 0.100 -6.970 0.000 -0.455 0.093 -4.910 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.630 0.000 0.000 0.000 -4.940 0.000 
CONNECTIVE TIS-
SUE DISORDERb 
7.734 1.345 5.750 0.000 3.063 1.371 2.230 0.025 0.000 0.000 2.420 0.015 0.001 0.000 5.160 0.000 
PEPTIC ULCERb 0.516 0.465 1.110 0.267 1.028 0.500 2.050 0.040 0.000 0.000 2.940 0.003 0.000 0.000 1.600 0.111 
LIVER DISEASEb -0.217 0.360 -0.600 0.547 0.748 0.244 3.060 0.002 0.000 0.000 1.970 0.048 0.000 0.000 1.560 0.118 
DIABETESb -0.624 0.931 -0.670 0.503 -0.391 0.944 -0.410 0.679 0.000 0.000 0.480 0.632 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.671 
DIABETES COM-
PLICATIONSb 
-12.21 1.452 -8.410 0.000 -8.758 1.376 -6.360 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -9.180 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -10.15 0.000 
PARAPLEGIAb -0.133 0.196 -0.680 0.498 -0.153 0.197 -0.780 0.438 0.000 0.000 -2.020 0.043 0.000 0.000 -2.050 0.041 
RENAL DISEASEb -0.693 0.324 -2.140 0.033 -0.299 0.427 -0.700 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.120 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.955 
CANCERb -1.299 0.335 -3.880 0.000 -0.490 0.350 -1.400 0.161 0.000 0.000 -2.230 0.026 0.000 0.000 -3.420 0.001 
METASTATIC CAN-
CERb 
2.741 5.592 0.490 0.624 7.752 5.923 1.310 0.191 0.001 0.001 1.890 0.058 0.002 0.001 2.840 0.005 
SEVERE LIVER 
DISEASEb 
-1.791 0.782 -2.290 0.022 -1.766 0.790 -2.240 0.025 0.000 0.000 -0.460 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.906 
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Appendix 5 continued: Regression results - modification in terms of hospital sizea 
Independent vari-
ables 






















Case-mix variables                 
HIVb -34.45 66.75 -0.520 0.606 -138.6 130.5 -1.060 0.288 -0.026 0.010 -2.680 0.007 -0.034 0.010 -3.530 0.000 
                 
Years                 
YEAR 2003 -0.035 0.006 -5.920 0.000 0.017 0.006 2.750 0.006 0.015 0.006 2.540 0.011 0.013 0.006 2.160 0.030 
YEAR 2004 0.027 0.006 4.450 0.000 0.027 0.006 4.280 0.000 0.026 0.006 4.190 0.000 0.032 0.006 5.040 0.000 
YEAR 2005 0.016 0.006 2.610 0.009 0.030 0.006 4.710 0.000 0.030 0.006 4.790 0.000 0.040 0.007 6.110 0.000 
YEAR 2006 0.066 0.006 10.39 0.000 0.054 0.007 8.280 0.000 0.054 0.006 8.520 0.000 0.069 0.007 10.33 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.560 0.010 58.21 0.000 0.567 0.010 57.060 0.000 0.580 0.009 61.16 0.000 0.581 0.012 49.21 0.000 
PSEUDO-R² 0.188    0.161    0.158    0.206    
a DEA II - Efficiency model including hospitals with beds 50, without university hospitals. 
b Share of all cases per hospital. 
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